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Abstract
Background: Systems medicine is the name for an assemblage of scientific strategies and practices that include
bioinformatics approaches to human biology (especially systems biology); “big data” statistical analysis; and
medical informatics tools. Whereas personalized and precision medicine involve similar analytical methods
applied to genomic and medical record data, systems medicine draws on these as well as other sources of
data. Given this distinction, the clinical translation of systems medicine poses a number of important ethical
and epistemological challenges for researchers working to generate systems medicine knowledge and clinicians
working to apply it.
Discussion: This article focuses on three key challenges: First, we will discuss the conflicts in decision-making that can
arise when healthcare providers committed to principles of experimental medicine or evidence-based medicine
encounter individualized recommendations derived from computer algorithms. We will explore in particular
whether controlled experiments, such as comparative effectiveness trials, should mediate the translation of
systems medicine, or if instead individualized findings generated through “big data” approaches can be
applied directly in clinical decision-making. Second, we will examine the case of the Riyadh Intensive Care
Program Mortality Prediction Algorithm, pejoratively referred to as the “death computer,” to demonstrate the
ethical challenges that can arise when big-data-driven scoring systems are applied in clinical contexts. We
argue that the uncritical use of predictive clinical algorithms, including those envisioned for systems medicine,
challenge basic understandings of the doctor-patient relationship. Third, we will build on the recent discourse
on secondary findings in genomics and imaging to draw attention to the important implications of secondary
findings derived from the joint analysis of data from diverse sources, including data recorded by patients in
an attempt to realize their “quantified self.”
Summary: This paper examines possible ethical challenges that are likely to be raised as systems medicine to
be translated into clinical medicine. These include the epistemological challenges for clinical decision-making, the use
of scoring systems optimized by big data techniques and the risk that incidental and secondary findings will
significantly increase. While some ethical implications remain still hypothetical we should use the opportunity
to prospectively identify challenges to avoid making foreseeable mistakes when systems medicine inevitably
arrives in routine care.
Keywords: Systems medicine, Big data, Epistemology, Translation, Secondary findings, Electronic health
records, Scoring systems, Clinical decision-making
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Background
What is Systems Medicine?
A new buzz word has recently entered the discourse on
the healthcare of the future: “systems medicine.” This
term is used to refer to research approaches intended to
improve understanding of biological mechanisms
through the use of methods from omics-based science,
systems biology, bioinformatics and network theory
[1–6]. In this respect, systems medicine is closely re-
lated to Personalized or Individualized Medicine in
that it is an emerging approach that involves the tailoring
of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment based on individ-
ual patient characteristics [7, 8]. This term is also used,
however, to promote a set of related translational practices
intended to apply medical informatics tools – such as
electronic decision support and patient-collected data – to
improve patient care, usually with the secondary aim of
making this data accessible for research [9–11]. Both of
these meanings share in common a strong focus on the
use of information technologies for the purposes of
medical science or clinical care. Based on a discourse
analysis of the literature on systems medicine [12],
then, we can define it as a spectrum of approaches that
include (a) bio-mathematical modelling to simulate the
mechanistic functioning of biological processes (bot-
tom-up simulation), (b) biostatistical simulation, using
hypothesis-free big data-approaches, to model the re-
lationships between the inputs and outputs of bio-
logical processes (top-down modeling), and (c) the
use of information technologies to synthesize diverse
sources of clinical data and automatically generate
clinical alerts and guidance (Fig. 1).
The distinction between bottom-up simulation and top-
down modelling is a subtle one, but one that is key to our
analysis. Bottom-up simulation, utilizing analytical methods
from bioinformatics, systems biology, and network theory,
is intended to create computer simulations of biological
processes at the level of constituent mechanisms, with
the hope that such simulations can be used to predict
how systems will respond to interventions or perturba-
tions [4, 5]. These methods depend on a causal under-
standing of the biological mechanisms of interest. For
this reason, research groups working within this strain
of systems medicine tend to focus on clarifying signaling
pathways and molecular pathways that connect, for ex-
ample, genotypes with phenotypes [13].
Top-down modelling, on the other hand, does not de-
pend on a detailed understanding of biological mecha-
nisms. Instead, top-down models are developed through
the statistical analysis of large datasets. This approach is
analogous to Amazon’s recommendation engine, which
utilizes a huge database of past purchasing behavior to
predict which items individuals might want to purchase
in the future. This approach, typically referred to as the
big data approach, relies on statistical associations ra-
ther than mechanistic understandings [14]. Amazon’s
recommendation engine does not, for example, require
an understanding of consumers’ motivations. The recom-
mendations it provides to customers are based instead on
the assumption that customers’ future purchasing behav-
ior can be predicted by comparing their past purchasing
behavior with that of customers who have purchased simi-
lar items. Similarly, top-down models in systems medicine
do not begin with signaling pathways or molecular path-
ways, but rather with large datasets reflecting biological
and clinical parameters.
As we will examine in this paper, the relationship be-
tween top-down modelling and clinical translation is a
matter of some controversy within systems medicine.
Some enthusiasts look forward to a day when top-down
Fig. 1 Systems Medicine can be understood as a heterogeneous set of methods and approaches connected by an emphasis on
information technologies
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modelling can be incorporated into clinical information
systems to generate useful predictions about individual
patients’ health and their response to clinical interven-
tions [15]. Others understand top-down modelling as a
hypothesis-generating step that might precede mechan-
istic research [16, 17] or the identification of promising
interventions whose effectiveness would require empir-
ical verification [18].
Within the vision for systems medicine, however, the
ultimate goal for both bottom-up simulation and top-
down modelling is the development of medical informat-
ics tools. These tools would depend on the collection of
large sets of clinical data, including, perhaps, data col-
lected by patients using fitness trackers or other mobile
devices. This data would then be used to support clinical
decisions, create a long-term electronic “memory” of co-
morbidities and other relevant information that could be
applied to ongoing treatment, and even be utilized for
future research that could be used to optimize these ap-
proaches [9, 10].
In short, then, systems medicine is not a single re-
search model or clinical approach. It is a heterogeneous
set of practices that have been promoted in recent years
under a single name. Perhaps one explanation for this
complexity, then, is the nascent state of these sciences.
For the most part, applications of systems medicine have
not reached clinical contexts with the exception of pilot
projects. It is likely that as efforts to apply these ideas to
clinical care continue, more clarity and focus will
develop.
It would be premature, then, to suggest that we can
anticipate or address all of the significant ethical chal-
lenges raised by systems medicine. Instead, we will focus
here on a few key issues especially relevant to specific
components of the field of systems medicine. First, we
will examine the compatibility of big data methods with
responsible clinical decision-making. This is not an
ethical issue proper, but rather an epistemological
concern that is likely to give rise to important ethical
challenges. Second, we will examine a case study that
highlights pitfalls in the application of probabilistic
scoring systems to clinical practice. Third, we will
examine the challenge of unintended findings that are
likely to be raised as the types of medical informatics
tools envisioned for systems medicine proliferate.
Discussion
Systems medicine and clinical decision-making: the
problem of epistemology
Epistemology is the field of philosophy that addresses
questions related to knowledge: How do we know what
we know? When should we be convinced, and how can
we convince others, that new knowledge we have discov-
ered is sound? How can we apply knowledge to real-life
problems, such as the application of scientific knowledge
to medicine?
Although these questions may seem far removed from
research on applying omics-based technologies to clinical
care, in truth they lie at the heart of ongoing debates
within systems medicine. As we have observed, systems
medicine is comprised of scientific approaches that are
based on mechanistic understanding, which we have
called bottom-up simulation, as well as those that are
agnostic to mechanisms, which we call top-down model-
ling. In order to see why this distinction is important,
and how it creates barriers for clinical applications of
systems medicine, we can examine the same trends
within a more mature movement in medicine: personal-
ized medicine.
As we observed earlier, systems medicine overlaps
somewhat with the vision for personalized medicine.
Both approaches share a focus on identifying statis-
tical associations using large datasets. But while per-
sonalized medicine focuses on genotype-phenotype
associations, systems medicine additionally draws on
other omics-based technologies, such as proteomics
and metabolomics, as well as broad sources for health
data, such as personal mobile devices. One important
scientific tool within personalized medicine is the
genome-wide association study (GWAS). This type of
research involves the identification of genotypes any-
where in the genome that are statistically associated
with health-related phenotypes, such as those related
to pharmaceuticals dosing. Advocates for personalized
medicine disagree about how to apply the knowledge
generated by GWAS studies to clinical care [19]. On
the one hand, many personalized medicine researchers
view genome-wide association study “hits” as the starting
point for research into molecular mechanisms; they view
GWAS as a hypothesis generating technology [20]. Only
once these mechanisms are elucidated could GWAS find-
ings be applied to clinical care. This emphasis on molecu-
lar mechanisms can even determine which GWAS findings
are considered valid. Some investigators, for example, use
understanding of molecular mechanisms to aid in the ana-
lysis of GWAS hits, focusing on genetic variants in genes
that are thought to be most likely to be causally-related to
the phenotype under study.
On the other hand, some personalized medicine re-
searchers do not insist on corroborating evidence de-
rived from research on molecular mechanisms. They
advance the idea that genotype-phenotype associations
with a large effect size are directly applicable to clinical
care. This assumption is most apparent in recent debates
on secondary findings, in which some argue that genetic
variants can be “actionable” even if the only evidence
supporting an association with a phenotype was derived
from GWAS studies [21]. This perspective is closely
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linked with the big data approach, which suggests that
top-down models can be effective for addressing real
world problems, including recommendations for online
retailers as well as health-related interventions.
However, the application of both bottom-up simula-
tions and top-down models to real world problems
can be unexpectedly complex. Within the field of per-
sonalized medicine, we can see this in work to apply
pharmacogenetic testing to the clinical use of clopido-
grel, a drug to prevent blood clots in patients with
abnormalities in the cardiovascular system, such as
after a coronary artery stent has been placed. The
mechanisms by which clopidogrel prevents clots was
already well understood: in its active form, it inhibits
the adenosine diphosphate P2Y12 receptor and there-
fore inhibits ADP-induced platelet activation. How-
ever, clopidogrel is a prodrug meaning that the form
contained in a tablet and taken by patients is not ac-
tive [22]. Before it can effectively inhibit clot forma-
tion, it must be bioactived in the body by the
cytochrome P450 enzyme produced by the CYP2C19
gene. Some people possess a variant in this gene,
however, which reduces the functioning of this enzyme
and reduces the bioactivation of clopidogrel (Fig. 2).
For those with such a variant in CYP2C19, we
would predict that clopidogrel can provide no benefit.
If doctors tested for this variant prior to starting clo-
pidogrel, it was assumed, they could identify patients
who would not respond to clopidogrel and instead
use a different medication.
Despite this rather well-developed mechanistic
model, however, it has proven remarkably difficult to
prove that pharmacogenetic testing for CYP2C19
makes a difference in patient outcomes. This is prob-
ably because the bioactivation of clopidogrel is not as
simple as the model demonstrated in Fig. 2 [23]. A
number of other factors influence the degree to which
clopiogrel is activated in the body, and its subsequent
ability to reduce clot formation (Fig. 3). As evidence
from clinical research eventually showed, the model in
Fig. 2 oversimplifies the mechanisms that determine
whether clopidogrel will work for a particular patient.
The biological action of clopidogrel is much more com-
plex than originally thought, and this greatly reduces
the utility of testing patients for CYP2C19 variants
prior to starting clopidogrel [24].
In this case, scientists working on the pharmaco-
genetics of clopidogrel made a prediction based on a
bottom-up understanding of the mechanisms through
which clopidogrel acts in the body. It turned out,
however, that this component of the human body,
and the way it functions in its complex environment,
was more complex than anticipated. It took clinical
trials, however, to recognize that our mechanistic un-
derstanding was inadequate to guide clinical practice.
This is not to say, however, that bottom-up simula-
tions and top-down models are always unsuitable for ap-
plication to clinical care. Modern bottom-up simulations
simply represents a more mathematical approach to un-
derstanding molecular mechanisms, and thus build on a
longstanding tradition in medicine that bases clinical
care on an understanding of human biology and physi-
ology. This tradition extends back to 19th century phys-
ician and laboratory scientist Claude Bernard, and
continues today in intensive care units and rare disease
clinics around the world [21]. Top-down models, how-
ever, have no true precedent in medicine, and thus re-
quire closer examination. In the next section, we will
examine an example from outside medicine both to fur-
ther demonstrate how top-down models are different
from bottom-up simulations, and to demonstrate why
the clinical application of top-down models should be
treated with extreme caution.
The Enigma Machine
Alan Turing was a British mathematician who worked in
the first half of the 20th century. During the second
World War, he was enlisted by the British Government
to devise a way to interpret messages that had been
encrypted using the German Enigma machine. His solu-
tion, remarkably ambitious for the time, was to build a
simulation of the Enigma machine that could, essentially,
Fig. 2 Simplified schema of bioactivation of clopidogrel
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run backwards. Although this proved to be an extraor-
dinarily difficult challenge in a world with no digital
computers, Turing proved that it was possible by exam-
ining the mechanisms the Enigma machine used for
encrypting messages. Because British intelligence had
managed to recover several Enigma machines, he was
able to literally “open the box” and see how it worked.
Based on this understanding of how the mechanism
worked, he was eventually able to build an early type of
computer that simulated the Enigma machine running
in reverse [25] (Fig. 4).
In many ways, systems medicine is based on
Turing’s work. Later in his career, Turing grew inter-
ested in the idea of simulating one computing device
using another computing device, even if the under-
lying mechanisms of the original device were not
understood. That this is possible is often referred to
as the “Turing-Church Thesis,” and the Turing Test
refers to his ideas about how such a simulation
could be evaluated.
He argued that a computer could be built to simulate
the ability of a human to engage in conversation. He was
not suggesting that the entire mind of a human would
need to be understood in order to create such a simula-
tion. Instead, he argued that a suitable simulation could
be constructed by observing typical human conversa-
tions, and would be judged to be effective if it could pass
what came to be known as the Turing Test. In this test,
a human would engage in a dialog with the simulation.
If the human could be fooled into thinking he was con-
versing with another human rather than a simulation,
the simulation had passed the test [26].
Turing’s work in both stages of his career serves as an
important inspiration for computation-based sciences
like systems medicine. In fact, systems medicine includes
both a modern equivalent of Turing’s mechanism-based
Fig. 3 Gladding et al. “Clopidogrel Pharmacogenomics: Next Steps A Clinical Algorithm, Gene–Gene Interactions, and an Elusive Outcomes Trial.”
JACC: Cardiovascular Interventions. Oct 2010;3 (10):995-1000. (Reuse of the figure with permission of Elsevier)
Fig. 4 Turing’s solution to decrypting messages encrypted on the Enigma machine
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work with the Enigma machine (bottom-up simulation),
and the biological equivalent of his later work on simu-
lating the output of the human mind (the Turing Test).
For systems medicine, however, the task of creating a
computation-based simulation of the body is not as sim-
ple as “opening the box” in the way Turing and other
British cryptologists were able to do at Bletchley Park.
There are certainly scientists who have this vision for
medicine – the vision of understanding the mechanisms
of the human body is the focus of all experimental medi-
cine from the time of Claude Bernard to today. But the
modern, “big data” approach in systems biology is in-
spired by the later Turing’s vision. In the top-down ap-
proach, the goal is to examine the inputs and the
outputs of the human body. The hope is that with
enough data, systems biology will be able to generate a
computer algorithm that is able to predict how the body
will respond to inputs, without actually understanding
the mechanisms of the body. For such a model, the in-
ternal workings of the body would remain a “black box.”
But such an algorithm could, it is hoped, pass a type of
clinical Turing test – to imitate the body well enough to
guide therapy. Data about an individual patient could be
gathered using clinical tests, electronic medical records,
and self-monitoring data, and predict a specific output,
such as the patient’s response to a variety of possible
therapies.
The challenge with this “black box” approach to the
human body, however, is that it precludes responsible
decisionmaking by patients and healthcare providers.
Figure 5a demonstrates how, in general terms, clin-
ical decisions are made. The clinician combines expert
knowledge about human biology, social determinants
of health, etc. with specific knowledge about the
circumstances of a patient in order to develop a clinical
plan.
In the tradition of evidence-based medicine (Fig. 5b),
clinicians depend primarily on a very particular type of
scientific knowledge – empirical findings from clinical
research – and particular types of knowledge about the
patient. They then utilize a very well-defined process of
analysis to apply those clinical research findings to
particular patients. Out of this deliberation comes a
decision about a clinical plan.
Another prominent approach is the experimental
medicine approach (Fig. 5c). In this model, clinicians
combine understanding of the mechanisms of the hu-
man body with specific observations about the physio-
logical condition of the patient. Using a process of
reasoning based on mechanistic cause-and-effect, he or
she is then able to develop a clinical plan.
With this in mind, we can begin to see the deep chal-
lenge that the top-down dimension of systems medicine
poses – and indeed the challenge that many industries
face as they work to apply big data analytics to their
conventional practices (Fig. 5d). Top-down modelling
provides clinicians with a computer algorithm, but that
algorithm represents the patient’s body as a black box. It
is not based on mechanistic science, and it is not based
on clinical research. It simply takes the patient’s data,
and generates an output. Neither clinicians nor patients
have a way to evaluate its predictions. We are faced with
the choice of following its predictions, or ignoring them.
But this choice is arbitrary, and based purely on
confidence in the black box.
We find this way of applying systems biology to med-
ical practice to be untenable. In order for medical care
to be successful, clinicians must be able to be
Fig. 5 Four approaches to develop a clinical plan
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accountable for their clinical decisions, and patients
must be given grounds for placing trust in the expertise
of their providers. Medical practice must therefore be
based on clinical decisions rooted in scientific know-
ledge, not on the capricious predictions of a black box.
Based on this analysis, then, we argue that the top-down
dimension of systems biology must be viewed as a basic
science – as an approach for generating hypotheses.
Whatever potential this approach may hold, it must be
mediated by more responsible approaches to medical
care, and must therefore not be applied prematurely to
clinical care.
In the next section, we will take this critique even
further. Taking the Riyadh Intensive Care Program
Mortality Prediction Algorithm as an example, we will
demonstrate how provider responsibility and patient
trust remain significant challenges for systems biology,
even when evidence-based medicine has been utilized
to validate the effectiveness of predictions based on
top-down modelling. In other words, even if this ap-
proach works, we are still faced with a complex eth-
ical decision about how and when to use it.
Ethical aspects of applying scoring systems to
clinical care
Within the systems medicine approach, both top-down
models and bottom-up simulations are intended for use
in clinical care. Specifically, they are designed to com-
bine data about a patient from a variety of sources (med-
ical records, biomarkers, etc.) and apply this data to an
algorithm designed to make predictions about how that
patient’s illness will progress or how he or she will re-
spond to a particular clinical intervention. Even when
these algorithms are based on bottom-up study of bio-
logical mechanisms, they are still fundamentally statis-
tical in nature. They are not based on a comprehensive
understanding of the patient’s biological status and all
mechanisms at play. Instead, they depend on a set of fac-
tors that can be measured relatively easily, combined
with observations in other patients, to predict which
outcomes are most likely.
This approach is fundamentally similar to earlier ef-
forts to develop risk scores based on clinical indicators
[16, 17]. Both approaches involve identifying (preferably
strong) statistical links between clinical features that can
be measured and outcomes of interest, using this data to
quantify the likelihood that certain outcomes will occur,
and using this score to inform clinical decision-making.
Systems medicine simply optimizes this approach by in-
corporating a larger number of clinical measurements
and allowing for more complex scoring algorithms.
From an ethical perspective, however, both systems
medicine tools and earlier scoring systems carry
important implications for clinical practice. In this way,
they are not simply pieces of information that are “good
to know”. After all, when such scores are generated in
clinical settings, an obligation is created for clinicians to
respond to them.
Risk scores in ICUs – The example of APACHE II
As we have seen, an important focus of systems
medicine is the generation of statistically-based clin-
ical predictions, predictions that promise to inform
clinicians of what is likely to happen, even if they can
cast no light on the question of why this will happen.
One general example of this in a clinical setting is a
risk scoring system intended to predict the chances
that a patient will survive: “Given all the information
we have about patient (P) and correlated with our ex-
perience about the outcome of all the patients in
similar circumstances for whom we have data in our
database, the estimated chance of survival for patient
(P) equals X %.” Framed this way, scoring systems
can seem quite jarring and impersonal. But in fact,
this approach to prognosis is already an important
factor of care in intensive care units (ICUs) around
the world; and has been for more than three decades.
These scoring systems for classifying the prognosis of
patients are not based on big data, but rather on
more mundane measurements like a patients’ age and
routine physiological measurements (temperature,
mean arterial pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate,
creatinine, hematocrit etc.). While a variety of such
scoring systems have been used, one of the best
known the APACHE II (Acute Physiology and
Chronic Health Evaluation II), which was designed to
measure the severity of disease for adult patients ad-
mitted to intensive care units [27]. It is designed to
be calculated on the day an adult patient is admitted
to the ICU, and results in a computer-based score be-
tween 0 to 71. Higher scores indicate more severe
disease and a higher risk for death. The link between
high APACHE II scores, influenced primarily by the
presence of multiple physiologic derangements, and
risk for dying has been shown repeatedly in inde-
pendent studies. When applied to the care of a single
patient, an APACHE II score essentially generates a
prediction about a patient’s risk for morbidity and
mortality that is based on the observed rate of out-
comes among the group of patients involved in earlier
studies who had the same score. APACHE II scores
can be used to inform decisions about which treat-
ments should be offered, as well as for creating ef-
fectiveness and quality controls [28].
APACHE II is not really intended to generate predic-
tions about an individual patient’s chance for survival.
Methods have certainly been developed to support such
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predictions, but given the wide variety of factors that in-
fluence this type of outcome, but are not accounted for
in the calculations, such methods are rather imprecise
[29–31]. This is just one important reason that it is
highly questionable to base decisions about discon-
tinuation of therapy or withholding of interventions
based on APACHE II scores and similar scoring sys-
tems. Not because these scores are irrelevant to prog-
nosis, but because they generate a prognostic score
that is not very precise.
As long as the big data-based scoring systems of the
future are regarded as merely updated methods that use
more data or more advanced algorithms to make predic-
tions that can be used for similar applications, we would
consider it as an improvement with no ethical concerns.
However, a brief view back in recent history can provide
a preview of the discussions that lay ahead if those in
the systems medicine movement come to regard big
data-based scoring systems as something more than just
a more precise evolution of earlier scoring systems. Spe-
cifically, serious ethical questions are likely to arise if
such methods are regarded as so precise they should be
used to make decisions about withdrawing treatment or
withholding life-extending interventions, based solely on
the predictive score.
The Riyadh Intensive Care Unit Program
The Riyadh Intensive Care Unit Program was an effort
developed in England in the 1990s that drew its name
from the capital of Saudi Arabia, where data from
several hundred thousand people had been collected
and which formed the statistical basis for the program
[32–34]. Unlike other scoring systems like APACHE
II, the Riyadh software incorporated not only clinical
observations, but also a measure of the intensity of
treatment and nursing care that a patient required
called the Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System
(TISS). The software used these and other measures
to generate a so-called “cost-performance profile.”
This analysis combined prognostic information (like
the APACHE II) and TISS with the intention of
evaluating the therapeutic effort (which reflected the
cost of treatment) in relation to the chances that an
individual patient would survive. By including information
outside of that relevant to a patient’s prognosis, the Riyadh
program became a cost-benefit analysis. It was intended
to suggest when the costs of a given therapy were out of
proportion to the patient’s chance of survival; it generated
an economic rationale for termination of treatment.
Moreover, the Riyadh algorithm was considered to be
highly accurate, with an accuracy in its predictions of
99.9 % [32–34].
Following the introduction of the Riyadh algorithm in
German ICUs, a debate among physicians, professional
societies, ethicists and politicians about the “death com-
puter” ensued. The program was widely critiqued, espe-
cially for including economic rationale into the decisions
to withdraw treatment [35, 36]. The authors them-
selves recognized the dangers, and warned: “We con-
sider that the data on outcome predictions with the
Riyadh Intensive Care Program have always been pre-
sented in a responsible manner. However, we advo-
cate extreme caution in the use of any computer
system which predicts death, and advise a careful ex-
planation of its functioning and dangers” [37]. Still,
they stuck by the ideas behind their project: “Because
of the problems of triage on admission, it is inevit-
able that a number of patients will be admitted to
the ICU with a hopeless prognosis. Treatment of the
critically ill with a hopeless prognosis is wasteful of
precious medical resources, as well as having a de-
moralizing effect on the nursing staff and the pa-
tients’ relatives” [37].
Should an (expensive) therapy be withheld from pa-
tients who are unlikely to survive? Should a computer
algorithm be allowed to determine, or even influence,
the fate of the critically ill? For this examination, it is
not necessary to delve deeper into the ethical debates
around the allocation of medical resources or the role
cost benefit analyses in medical care. Instead, we simply
want to stress that these types of discussions are inevit-
able once the systems medicine approaches begin to in-
corporate a greater number of data sources, and lead to
the development of algorithms with a higher predictive
value. The utilization of non-medical data, up to and in-
cluding economic data, open the door for abuse or, at
the very least, the conflation of medical and non-
medical considerations in decision-making. And the per-
ception of greater predictive power inevitably increases
the likelihood that such scores will be used as justifica-
tions apart from other important considerations, like
provider judgments.
Ultimately the Riyadh algorithm failed. The beginning
of the end came when further research called the reli-
ability of its predictions into question. The authors of
Riyadh found no false predictions of death, but several
other investigations identified a survival rate of up to
41 % among those predicted to die [31]. At least one
German study has shown that the prognoses of experi-
enced clinicians are at least as good as those generated
by the Riyadh algorithm, and another study showed that
of 53 patients with “high probability of death,” one third
survived. Other important studies have identified a range
of problems associated with the application of score-
based mortality predictions to individual patients [38].
The Riyadh program never achieved the 99.9 % reli-
ability that was promised. For a time, however, the belief
that it could provide highly accurate predictions using
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all relevant data (including economic data) drove a sig-
nificant amount of excitement. If, in the coming years, a
big data-based scoring system attains the accuracy that
was promised for the Riyadh algorithm, we expect these
ethical issues will arise again. What role should patient’s
wishes play? How do we respect the individuality of the
dying life? What weight should be given to consider-
ations of quality of life? What chance for survival should
be accepted as for continuing treatment (after all, even if
the chance of survival is at 2 %, this still is that 2 out of
100 patients will survive)? What effect should scoring
systems have on the doctor-patient relationship, and vice
versa? What justifications could be given for rejecting
the “objective” prediction generated by an algorithm?
What if the score indicates a good chance for survival
but the patient does not want to continue treatment?
Even if we were to have access to flawless prognos-
tic algorithms, we would still be left with these larger
ethical questions about what to do with this prognos-
tic information. In order to translate prognosis into
recommendation, we need to know about the pa-
tients’ values [39]. Even in the evidence-based medi-
cine tradition, with its emphasis on basing decisions
on empirical data, there is still an emphasis on taking
patient preferences and perspectives into account
when making clinical decisions [40]. In what ways
should systems medicine understand the balance be-
tween big data-informed predictions and individual
patients’ values, lifestyles, and declarations of will?
At a more fundamental level, we even need to ask
whether there is an appropriate role for big data pre-
dictions in medical care. Should serious decisions like
those related to a change in therapeutic approach or
the discontinuation of a therapy be linked with purely
statistical interpretations of probability and risks? Or
perhaps it is better to assume that the bigger the data
and the better the score, the stronger would be the
argument for not using it as a sole predictor? Not
because of the data for which it can account, but be-
cause of the data it cannot. In the final analysis, we
are likely to conclude that algorithm-based prediction
is never the end, but only the beginning of a
decision-making-process. This was even acknowledged
by René Chang, one of the key developers of the
Riyadh algorithm, defending his software: “If the com-
puter makes a prediction of death, check that there
have been no errors in data collection or entry; then
determine if there is any treatment which has not yet
been tried that might make a substantial difference to
the patient’s outcome. If, in the clinicians’ judgment,
there is such a treatment, then that treatment should
be tried and the patient observed for a significant im-
provement. If there is no improvement or if in the
first instance there were no further treatment regimen
available, discussions concerning the withdrawal of
treatment should commence with relatives and staff
before a final decision is made” [41].
The ethical dimension of incidental or secondary
findings in systems medicine
As shown above, many of the ideas included with the
“systems medicine” umbrella depend on the develop-
ment of medical informatics tools. Among these, of
course, are more sophisticated electronic health records
(EHRs) that would make it possible for analyses to be
performed using stored patient data, including, for ex-
ample, her co-morbid health conditions. At present, the
records of an individual patient’s health and medical care
are not routinely stored in such a way that they are sim-
ultaneously available for such an analysis. In the future
envisioned for systems medicine, however, it would be-
come routine for long-term patient data to be collected
and made accessible across computer systems. In this
way, every new treatment and new health encounter
would add new information to existing patient data.
This will eventually lead not only to long term storage
of correct (and also incorrect!) diagnoses, but also po-
tentially to an increase in the number of potentially rele-
vant findings about patient’s health that can be
generated. In this way, the advances in eHealth envi-
sioned for systems medicine will, almost by design, lead
to a continuous and cumulative growth in the number
of incidental or secondary findings that can be gener-
ated (cf. Fig. 6).
Fig. 6 EHRs as electronic “memories”
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Based on current evidence, two types of medical stud-
ies seem especially prone to creating secondary findings
in a future medical practice driven by analyses of EHR
data: whole body imaging techniques and genomic se-
quencing [42–47]. Extensive evidence from the research
context makes it clear that both of these technologies
generate a huge amount of information that is of poten-
tial diagnostic, therapeutic or prognostic relevance to pa-
tients, or which indicates a need for further examination
to determine its relevance [42, 46, 47].
Presently, neither whole body imaging nor genomic
sequencing is widely used in clinical care. However,
both are already available in research and direct-to-
consumer contexts. Someday soon, however, these
examinations are likely to be incorporated into clinical
care and deposited in patient EHRs, assuming that
either (a) data generated in the research or direct-to-
consumer context will find its way into the clinical con-
text or (b) these technologies will enter use in clinical
settings to inform big data analyses. If this occurs, it is
inevitable that this type of data will be applied to ana-
lyses not driven by active clinical questions – and thus
generate findings that are incidental or secondary to
the original reasons the tests were performed. Although
these findings might be beneficial to patients, they can
also create harms. In one study, for example, we stud-
ied participants taking part in a population based-study
in Germany that involved whole body MRIs. When this
research examination generated suspicious findings,
some participants experienced significant harm and dis-
tress [42, 43, 46].
If we consider that even more sources of data will
be incorporated into electronic health records – from
mobile apps geared toward the “quantified self” to
health examinations like psychological analyses and
fitness evaluations – we can see that the collection of
persistent personal patient information available for
analysis is likely to continue to grow. This will lead,
however, to significant increase in the frequency and
numbers of secondary findings that can be generated
(cf. Fig. 7).
If systems medicine proceeds as envisioned, it will not
just be the amount of stored patient data that will in-
crease. The vision for systems medicine also includes the
analysis of this data for research purposes, leading to an
increase in the number of patient characteristics and
biomarkers considered to have clinical relevance. Going
further, a major goal of big data research is to identify
associations among these factors that, in combination,
can be used to make clinical predictions, creating a
whole additional level of associations and correlations
through which secondary findings can be generated.
If these changes take place as predicted, it will become
crucial to address a number of important normative
questions, including:
1) Who is to decide which findings need to be
communicated to providers and patients?
2) By what methods, in a world of big data and
patient empowerment, should secondary findings
be communicated?
3) How can secondary findings be prioritized responsibly
within the treatment context so as to help patients
and providers handle a large volume of such findings?
The discourse within human genetics over secondary
findings gives us some idea about how these questions
will be answered [44, 45]. It is already well-recognized,
for example, that it can be difficult for patients and pro-
viders to anticipate such findings and prospectively de-
velop a plan for addressing them. When data on the
scale of whole genome sequence is generated, such a dis-
cussion would require the patient to be informed about
the genetic variants that could potentially be identified
beyond those relevant to the clinical question motivating
the testing, but also understand the various implications
for this information and the wide variability in the un-
certainty accompanying such findings. Even in Germany,
where legal standards are established for the design of
such a genetic consultation process, the approaches used
for addressing the challenge of secondary findings re-
mains highly inconsistent overall.
Fig. 7 Potential sources for secondary findings
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The debate over incidental and secondary findings is
certainly not new [48]. In human genetics, for example,
debates over best practices for informed consent, risk
communication, and assessment of clinical validity,
among others, predate the current discourse around Per-
sonalized or Individualized Medicine [49–51]. In fact,
similar debates took place with the field of public health
genetics in the 1990s [52]. Nevertheless, systems medi-
cine could provide the context for a range of techno-
logical developments that will increase the urgency for
identifying effective methods for handling secondary
findings and solving some of the difficult questions faced
by bioethicists during the last decade and beyond.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine three possible ethical chal-
lenges that are likely to be raised as systems medicine
comes to be translated into clinical medicine. These
include the epistemological challenges for clinical
decision-making created by black box algorithms, the
use of scoring systems optimized by big data tech-
niques capable of integrating non-medical data into
routine healthcare and healthcare systems, and the
risk that incidental and secondary findings will signifi-
cantly increase as big data-driven EHRs are imple-
mented in clinical care. At this point in time, all
three of these concerns are somewhat conjectural. We
might also have added other predictable issues with
big data, including concerns related to privacy, data
protection, and ownership of data [53]. While such
conjectural work runs the risk of leading to an ethics
of “false alarms,” it also provides an important opportunity
to prospectively identify challenges, gather empirical evi-
dence earlier rather than later, and, hopefully, avoid mak-
ing foreseeable mistakes. To be sure, excessive hype
should have no place in either the science of systems
medicine or the study of its ethical, legal and societal im-
plications. However, in both of these domains it makes
sense to continuously look ahead so we are ready for the
future when it inevitably arrives.
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